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The Land Use Mire
Allison Dunhamt
American Law of Zoning. By Robert M. Anderson. Rochester, New
York: The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company; San Francisco:
The Bancroft-Whitney Company, 1968. 4 volumes. $100.00.
The law concerned with guiding the physical development and loca-
tion of activities that use land is almost as old as the current Key Num-
ber system; but it was only in 1956 that a portion of that subject-
zoning-was identified with a separate title. Prior to World War II
the law schools considered the subject as part of "municipal law" and
treated it on a par with the regulation of barber shops, pool halls, ped-
dlers, and other types of minor private conduct. Even after the War
one of the two major new treatises on property law ignored the sub-
ject.' Similarly, the codifiers and statutory revisors have had difficulty
in assigning a niche to the subject. They have produced not only sep-
arate types of legislation for each kind of government authorized to
deal with land use (cities, villages, towns, and counties) but also sep-
arate nomenclatures for each new type of problem. Thus, after devel-
oping "zoning" as a device for segregating land use, the legislatures
have now enacted special legislation for "planned development dis-
tricts" as a means for mixing up the uses again. It is odd that the
federal activity since the 1920's dealing with urban land development
has not produced as much standardization in land use law terminology
as similar federal activity has in public health and welfare law and
labor law.
One would expect that a major treatise on "zoning" published in
1968 would deal with this terminological and conceptual morass and
not only define those aspects of land use regulation that ought to be
considered under the "zoning" rubric, but also provide a schema for
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classifying, defining, and understanding the law concerned with land
use. Instead, this four volume treatise2 makes almost no reference to
air and water pollution laws, to state laws controlling land use around
highway interchanges and location of access roads from private devel-
opments, or to state laws which establish watershed districts and
strictly control land use within these areas; it makes only minor refer-
ence to "urban renewal," and in twenty-five chapters of commentary,
provides only one chapter on subdivision control, another on official
maps, and two on planning. On the other hand, if one is not misled by
the title word "zoning," one can find a great deal of material in this
treatise about law which permits development without regard to zone
on the basis of an individual decision concerning a particular parcel of
land, whether the decision be called a variance, special use permit,
subdivision permit, or even urban renewal.
The author's intention was
... to marshall the significant cases and statutes relating to plan-
ning, zoning, and subdivision control, and to assemble a fair
sampling of the municipal regulations as well as the administra-
tive and judicial forms used in these areas of the law.3
The bulk of the cases discussed come from the courts of "the north-
eastern states, particularly those of New Jersey, New York and Pennsyl-
vania [because they] decide an unusually large number of planning
cases." 4 The author claims that this eastern parochialism "is inherent
in the subject matter"" despite Census Bureau, Department of Com-
merce, and Federal Reserve Board statistics, as well as the literature
of architectural criticism, which suggest that most land use develop-
ment controlled by the laws studied in the treatise has occurred else-
where since the 1950's. Such uneven treatment of the subject is neces-
sary, one must admit, when land development law is studied in terms
of the greatest number of precedents rather than in terms of effective
use and application of the laws.
The author goes on to say,
[T]he materials [themselves] are arranged and finely sub-
divided in a manner intended to serve the attorney or planner
who is seeking an answer or lead .... 6
2. R. ANDE sON, AmucAN LAw oF ZONING (1968) [hereinafter cited as ANDM.s ].
3. 1 ANDERSON § 1.01, at 2.
4. Id. § 1.01, at 4-5.
5. Id. § 1.01, at 4.
6. Id. § 1.01, at 2.
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The tax literature and looseleaf services demonstrate that an index can
be "arranged and finely subdivided in a manner which assists the at-
torney" without compromising the goal of arranging issues intelligently
and logically in the text. The author, unfortunately, has generally
been satisfied with an uncritical "listing" of issues and problem areas
with a resulting deemphasis or omission of many meaningful relation-
ships. In Chapter 7, relying on a single New York case, De Sena v.
Gulde,7 we find the assertion
[a] municipality is without power to enact a zoning amendment
solely for the purpose of preventing riots and injuries to persons,
or economic loss which might result from riots.8
It is true that De Sena contains language which might lead an uncriti-
cal reader to make that assertion but the case concerned a legislative
judgment that Plan A (preferred by the legislators for stimulating eco-
nomic development in the community) would, because of popular hos-
tility to the plan, tend to produce "riots and injuries to residents,
merchants, and shoppers [which would] outweigh the benefits to the
village from the present change";" therefore, the village legislators
amended the zoning ordinance to change the permitted use of the land
in issue from light manufacturing to residential. If the author's con-
clusion about this case is correct, then many architecture and city
planning schools are wasting a great deal of the taxpayer's money to
learn by empirical studies whether a physical layout can be devised
which will help prevent crime and riot. One need not agree with Jane
Jacob's argument in The Death and Life of Great American Cities-
that the physical arrangement of city buildings, streets and parks has
a significant impact on public safety-to be disturbed at the author's
advice to city planners and attorneys that a zoning ordinance cannot
compel a particular physical layout where its purpose is to reduce the
likelihood that crime or riots will occur. Baron Haussmann used radial
boulevards in his rebuilding of Paris in the mid-nineteenth century in
part to control riots; and L'Enfant's radial street plan for Washington,
D.C., was adopted, in part, for a similar purpose. The issues in De
Sena are simply not the same as those presented by a zoning ordinance
which seeks to assist in the prevention of crime or riots by establishing
a certain physical arrangement of buildings and streets. While it is
7. 24 App. Div. 2d 165, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1965).
8. 1 ANDERSON § 7.36, at 558.
9. De Sena v. Guide, 24 App. Div. 165, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1965).
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clear that constitutional doctrine in the United States attempts to pre-
vent accomplishing such a purpose, or any governmental purpose, by
Haussmann's despotic methods, it is equally clear that the general wel-
fare clause would not outlaw a reasonable zoning plan which at-
tempted to control crime and riots. De Sena might better have been
placed with the material on "contract zoning"'1 where, assuming a
contract to zone in a particular way is otherwise permissible, the ele-
ment of "duress" becomes a relevant contract law consideration.
While lawyers may find the "finely" classified cases of the treatise
helpful, what kind of assistance does it provide the legislative drafts-
men? One would expect it to be of great help since, like a scholar, a
draftsman often seeks to rearrange existing case and statutory material
into a more logical and orderly framework. Although this treatise
suffers from the organizational faults discussed above, the organization
of the material does permit an appraisal of "zoning" law which a
simple digest system would not. If the draftsman keeps his distance
from the minutiae of the subject matter and keeps himself from be-
lieving that the subtitle "doctors, dentists and surgeons"' involves
principles different from the subtitle "attorneys,"' ' he can glean from
this work many, if not most, of the relevant questions which should be
posed in drafting any general revision of the subject matter. The
treatise offers little insight, however, into the more general issues that
must be considered in drafting zoning laws.
The treatise is conventional in ascribing to the state the function of
enabling specified local governments to exercise control of land de-
velopment. But one need not deny the standard rule that a local gov-
ernment has only the specific powers delegated to it to argue that the
major function of the state zoning enabling act is to limit the conduct
of local governments. And although the author describes the state's
use of the zoning power as minimal, his materials cast doubt on this
characterization and reflect, instead, the significant control which the
state exerts over local governmental land use decisions.
For example, the state restricts a local government's zoning power
by requiring it to follow a detailed procedure, with many more re-
strictions than accompany almost every other enabling statute delegat-
ing regulatory powers to local governments. Several justifications for
these restrictions come to mind. First, standardizing the process by
10. 1 ANDERSON § 8.21, at 614-20.
11. 2 id. § 10.04, at 218.
12. Id. § 10.06, at 217.
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which the zoning power is exercised should simplify the task of the
courts in reviewing such decisions. State law, unfortunately, falls far
short of realizing this objective. The procedure required for enacting
a zoning ordinance will differ from the procedure for enacting a sub-
division control ordinance. And the procedure of the Board of Adjust-
ment, which handles flexibility in zoning by granting variances or
special use permits, will differ from the procedure of the Plan Com-
mission, which handles flexibility in connection with subdivisions.
Does it make any sense from the landowner's point of view to require
him to follow different procedures depending upon whether he is seek-
ing permission to develop one or fifty lots? Does it make any sense from
the reviewing court's point of view that, before it can determine the
merits of an attack on the procedure used by the local government, it
must first determine if a "variance," or "special exception or use," or
"subdivision permit" is being sought? Isn't the basic notion that the
landowner is seeking to do something which he is not permitted to do
as of right because of the zoning ordinance? Therefore shouldn't the
procedures for seeking special permission to develop land be the same?
Another, and apparently the more important, justification for re-
stricting zoning power is to impose the state's planning decisions on
the local governments. In discussing state use of the zoning power the
author suggests that the state's alternatives are limited: it can grant
general power to the local government, it can regulate land develop-
ment itself, or it can prepare plans with state or regional applicability.
But there is another alternative: the state can enact a policy plan as a
guideline for the local governments. The state enabling act could be
considered, in most instances, a policy plan which directs the local
government to develop land according to certain principles while giv-
ing the local government discretion in determining what specific land
development activities will implement the state policy. Although the
author does not consider this approach in his treatise, many examples
of such planning decisions can be found in his materials:
1. the four corners of a street intersection should be zoned in the
same manner; 13
2. the use of land for any educational purpose, whether public,
religious, sectarian or denominational, should not be restricted;14
13. See 1 id. § 5.11, at 263.
14. See 2 id. §§ 9.08-.10, at 121-28.
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3. the state public utility commission, not the local government, has
the ultimate power to determine the location of utilities;15
4. certain commercial uses (primarily extraction industries) should
be allowed to continue, if once begun;' 6
5. regulations within a district must be uniform for each class or
kind of development permitted within that district.'7
Sometimes it is not clear if the statute is prescribing a land use policy
even though it could be so interpreted. For example, where states
grant public utilities or private agencies eminent domain power, it
might be inferred that the state has decided that whatever land uses
these utilities or agencies undertake have priority over alternative
land uses. Similarly, land uses which receive tax exempt status might
be considered preferred to alternative uses. Whether such statutes, or
the zoning enabling statutes, in fact represent state policy decisions
determining preferred land uses is critical when the courts are faced
with challenges to public utility land use decisions.
The typical professional planner deplores legislative policy promul-
gations and argues that state planning agencies should establish such
policies under broad grants of power from the legislature. The plan-
ners argue that most planning, particularly at the local level, is de-
pendent upon specific locational concerns; since each parcel of land is
different, the state can properly express its policy only through an
administrative agency which can look at particular parcels. But land
use policies need not be vitiated by the uniqueness of individual land
parcels. That all street intersections should be permitted to be simi-
larly developed, that education is so important that it should not be
prohibited anywhere-these are the kind of decisions that legislatures
can make and should be encouraged to make.
Another issue of great importance in land use development, not dis-
cussed in the treatise, is how to account for regional and state considera-
tions in local zoning. The traditional constitutional and statutory
rhetoric limits the governing body to legislation which promotes the
safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public. But which
public? Is the Cook County, Illinois government required to consider
only the public which lives or owns land within its jurisdiction? Or
must it consider the effect its land use decisions will have on the people
15. See id. §§ 9.06, 9.32-.33, at 117, 181-83.
16. See 1 id. § 6.03, at 311.
17. See id. § 5.17, at 287.
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in Illinois, the Great Lakes Region, or the United States. Several
models can be used that suggest the relevant publics for local govern-
ments.
How is welfare maximized under a model that considers it best that
the local governments be as independent as possible? The state welfare
is no more than the sum of the welfare promoted by each local gov-
ernment less the subtractions from welfare caused when municipality
A enacts a regulation which harms the public in municipality B. Under
this model the state legislature should referee such conflicts by deter-
mining what kinds of local regulations cause economic and social
harm to the state and preempt local governments in those areas with
state regulations. Each local government accordingly, should concern
itself only with what is best for its own public within the constraints
imposed by state statutes. If the ambit of local governmental authority
is to be determined according to a fiduciary obligation model, a similar
conclusion is suggested: a local government would breach its fiduciary
duty to its constituents if it decided on one form of land use develop-
ment rather than another because the former would benefit the state
as a whole while providing somewhat less benefit to the local public
than the latter.
The federal constitutional model seems to assume that states will
regulate commerce so as to benefit maximally their own constituents;
when conflict between two states or between a state and the federal
government arises, the judiciary, independent of the disputing publics,
determines whether the burden on interstate commerce is an "undue"
or "reasonable" one. By analogy, this model requires each independent
governmental unit to decide what land use development best promotes
the welfare of its public; an independent third party will resolve any
disputes that arise. Finally, the planning and zoning enabling acts and
the planning literature appear to be based on a model of local govern-
ment which require the local government to take full account of the
concerns of other publics and act so as to maximize welfare for the
state or region.
If any of these models is followed in current land use development
law, the treatise suggests by implication that it is probably the federal
constitutional model: in general, procedural, not substantive, limita-
tions are imposed upon the local legislative and administrative zoning
decisions; and when the courts are required to review local govern-
mental decisions they do not require that the state's welfare have been
an independent factor of the decision. Almost one half of the treatise's
chapters are concerned with the problems faced by the local legislatures
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and administrators in adhering to the prescribed procedures, since
failure is the principal basis for attacking zoning decisions in the
courts.
The procedural requirements take many forms. First, like the De-
partment of Commerce Standard Zoning Enabling Act, most state
statutes require that a local ordinance be enacted only after a set of
recommendations (which may be in statutory form) has been specifi-
cally prepared by a zoning or planning commission which has held one
or more public hearings. The Standard Zoning Enabling Act, how-
ever, does not extend these strict requirements to amendments, even
though the amendment may substitute a completely new ordinance
for the existing one. The enabling acts usually require that public
hearings be held before the legislative body, in addition to those held
before the administrative or executive commissions; but the legislature
is not bound by either the zoning commission recommendations or the
points developed at the legislative hearings. The cases which the author
discusses in this area suggest that the attempts to rationalize and ob-
jectify the decision-making process have not been effective-the cases
deal with the disqualification of legislators for personal interest, bias,
prejudgment, or improper influence.
Second, most state statutes require that zoning decisions be conso-
nant with a comprehensive plan. The courts quickly read this require-
ment out of the statute by concluding that a plan is inherent in pre-
paring and enacting a zoning ordinance. The plan is therefore what is
enacted, no prior statement of the plan is required, and landowners
will probably be unsuccessful in challenging a zoning ordinance on
these grounds.
Third, traditional administrative law requires that when power is
delegated to an agency such as a planning commission or board of
zoning appeals, it be delegated according to a standard which governs
the administrator's conduct. If the agency participates in the adjudica-
tory process, it must give notice of the issues to the interested parties,
hold hearings, and issue findings of fact which support the decision.
The cases dealing with these issues which the author presents demon-
strate the inadequacy of this approach for restricting an administrator's
power. A standard which authorizes a special permit to be issued
"where the public welfare will be served and the neighborhood not
injured" is scarcely a greater limit on administrative judgment than
the similar constitutional limit on legislative judgment. To restrict the
grant of power ceded to local adjudicatory agencies, many ordinances
now state that a finding of fact which merely restates the terms of the
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ordinance or standard is insufficient for compliance with the required
procedure.
Although the treatise is primarily intended as a tool for the private
or city attorney, it does provide the legislative draftsman with a sub-
stantially complete list of the problems to which his attention should
be addressed. The materials collected in the treatise demonstrate that
a local government can be given broad powers to control the land use
decisions of a private landowner. But can a set of principles be estab-
lished to determine when the freedom of a landowner can and should
be restricted in order to promote the common good? Can an objective
set of guidelines be established to control administrators' decisions?
The treatise records the existence of these issues but offers no solutions.
Are land development controls really so incapable of objective expres-
sion that legislative fiat-such as the street intersections rule-is the
only fair and certain way of proceeding?
Continuity and Change in Constitutional
Adjudication
William E. Nelsont
The Philosophy of the American Constitution: A Reinterpretation of
the Intentions of the Founding Fathers. By Paul Eidelberg. New York:
Free Press, 1968. Pp. 339. $6.95; $2.95 (paper).
Must the Supreme Court apply constitutional principles derived
from the thought of the Constitution's draftsmen to contemporary
problems far beyond the range of that thought? Undoubtedly the most
general principles-that no state may deny persons equal protection
of the laws, for example-must be drawn from the past in the sense
that they must be drawn from the text of the Constitution itself. But
must the Court accept the past's subsidiary principles, such as the
principle enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson' that state-imposed racial
segregation does not violate equal protection if separate but equal
facilities are provided? Or may it reformulate such principles to meet
t Teaching Fellow and Charles Warren Fellow in American Legal History, Harvald
Law School. A.B. 1962, Hamilton College; LL.B. 1965. New York University.
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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changing political, economic, and social conditions? These pervasive
issues in constitutional adjudication have provoked much judicial and
scholarly comment in recent years.2 But the commentators have
shunned historical questions, such as the extent to which the framers
of the Constitution sought to bind subsequent generations to their
principles and the extent to which subsequent generations have
deemed themselves so bound.
Paul Eidelberg's recent book3 implicitly raises these interesting his-
torical questions. The tacit yet fundamental premise upon which all of
Eidelberg's arguments rest is that prior to the Constitutional Conven-
tion the founding fathers had developed a political philosophy, that
they incorporated that philosophy into the Constitution, and that that
philosophy, still unchanged, remains as relevant to interpreting the
Constitution today as it was in 1787. For Eidelberg, constitutional
interpretation involves no more than a "compelling obligation" to as-
certain that philosophy and "consider the intentions of the Founders."4
Eidelberg's analysis of the Constitution is primarily theoretical or,
as he calls it, "dialectical."' He does not resort to history for any more
subtle purpose than to find the framers' "intentions." He rejects the
notion "that the Constitution has meaning only as a product of certain
historical circumstances" which have no present-day significance. He
"den[ies] that its essence is change," and argues that it is permanence.
He discovers the Constitution's permanence first in the framers' estab-
lishment of a mixed regime incorporating both democratic and aristo-
cratic principles, and second in their creation of a Supreme Court
having the power of judicial review. Some recent historical writing,
however, suggests that these two contrivances were neither expected by
the framers to make, nor have they in fact made, "the will of the
people who established the Constitution... binding upon the people
now living." 7
2. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.. 663, 669-70 (1966) (Douglas,
J.), 675-80 (Black, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 5"M (11165)(Black, J., dissenting); A. Bic,.L, THE LrAsr DANGERous BmNCHI (196-); G. SCauDoRa,
CoNsTrrumONAL PoLITCS (1960); M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND PoLrrics IN TIlE SUPR.%IE COURT
(1964); Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights. 80 FHAav.
L. REv. 91 (1966); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Ilinv.
L. REv. 1 (1959); Wyzanski, Book Review, 57 HiAv. L. REV. 389 (1944).
3. P. EmELBERG, THE PHILISOPHY OF THE AMERIc CONsrnToN: A REINTERPRETATiON
OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1968) [hereinafter cited as EIDELmEo].
4. Id. 224.
5. Id. 28.
6. Storing, Foreword to EIDELBERc. at viii-ix.
7. EiDELBERG 225.
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Eidelberg contends "that the Republic established by the Founding
Fathers was understood by them to be a Mixed Regime."8 He sees this
"mixed regime" as a compromise solution to the "fundamental and
controversial question, the question of who should rule"---that is,
which class should rule.10 In his scheme "the diversity of opinions,
passions, and interests"" fostered by democracy would find representa-
tion in the House of Representatives, while the Senate, "over against
the democratic justice upheld by the House,' 2 would "endow ... the
community . . . with a permanent will"'3 and "uphold aristocratic
justice"' 4 based on qualities of reason, truth, merit and excellence.
The Presidency, according to Eidelberg, will preserve the balance
between the two houses of Congress.' 5 The President is kept from
succumbing to either by "the most brilliantly conceived aspect of the
Constitution, namely, the presidential electoral system,"'1 which ren-
ders him independent of the democratic masses and the Congress, since
he is elected by neither. Instead he is elected by men who can judge
his ability to fulfill the qualities demanded of the President-mon-
archic qualities of leadership and persuasion, by which he can convince
people of the lasting rightness of his measures.
17
This essentially Beardian concept of the Constitution casting a
balance between forces of democratic instability and aristocratic perma-
nance is open to question. As is true of the history of the Revolu-
tionary era as a whole,' 8 the 1787-1788 debates on the Constitution
cannot be explained solely as a contest between wealthy aristocrats
and impoverished democrats. Aristocrats and democrats appeared on
both sides of the constitutional struggle. Democratic frontiersmen
from North Carolina and western Massachusetts usually opposed the
new Constitution, but similar frontiersmen from Georgia and northern
New Hampshire usually supported it; aristocratic Charlestonians,
8. Id. 3 (emphasis in the original).








17. Id. 191, 194, 200.
18. See Bailyn, Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth.Century
America, 67 Am. HisT. REv. 339, 341-43 (1962); Morgan, The American Revolution: Re-
visions in Need of Revising, 14 Wm. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 3, 8-12 (1957).
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Philadelphians, and Bostonians generally favored it, but similarly
aristocratic Virginians were almost evenly divided.10 Confusion is com-
pounded when we look at the positions taken by those who attended
the 1787 convention. Some wealthy men, such as George Washington
and Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, favored the Constitution, as did
some rather impoverished men, such as James Madison, Alexander
Hamilton, and William Pierce of Georgia. Similarly, among the Con-
stitution's opponents were the wealthy George Mason of Virginia and
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts and the less wealthy Luther Martin
of Maryland. 20
This confusion, which could be infinitely multiplied, suggests that
men did not divide over economic issues. Rather they seem to have
chosen sides over the central political concern of eighteenth-century
Americans-how best to preserve liberty and restrain power.21 They
saw power as an "encroaching, .... insatiable" and "brutal" force,22 not
because of its own nature, for power was an inherent and necessary
element of government, but because of "the nature of man-his sus-
ceptibility to corruption and his lust for self-aggrandizement."23 Every-
one agreed that men were subject to corruption when power fell into
their hands.2 4 The greatest danger of all occurred when men joined
together in parties or factions, which usually were monarchic, aristo-
cratic, or democratic in composition, and one such faction gained
control of the government;25 a faction in control "necessarily prove[d]
destructive to the... Rights of the People ... ."20 Liberty could be
preserved, however, by mixing elements of all three factions in one
constitution, where they could counteract each other and thereby keep
the body politic stable and healthy. The English constitution in par-
ticular embodied this theory of mixed government: the king gave the
19. See F. MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE 133-36, 165-66, 188-204, 239-51, 268-83. 311-21
(1958); J. T. fAN, TE ANTiFEDERALsrs 191-92, 196.97, 201-02, 206-09, 224, 232-33 (1961).
20. See R. BRowN, CHARLES BEAMD AND THE CoNSrrrtnoN 78-79, 81, 83 (1956); M. FAR-
RAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTrruToN OF THE UNrrED STATES 81, 206-07 (1913); F. MC.
DONALD, supra note 19, at 44, 48-49, 54-57, 69-73, 84-85, 88, 164, 166.
21. See 1 B. BAiLYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMRINcAN REvoLUTION, 1750-1776, at 38-39
(1965); C. KENYON, THE ANTiEnDucas'rs xxvii (1966); Bailyn, The Origins of American
Politics, 1 PERSpECrES IN AmIacAN HISroRY 9, 35, 45-46 (1967).
22. See 1 B. BAmLYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERcAN REVoLUrIoN, 1750-1776, at 39 (1965),
quoting from eighteenth-century sources.
23. Id. 40.
24. Id. 40-41; 0. HANLN 8: M. HANLiN, THE PopuLAR SouRcas OF POLITICAL Au-
THoRITY 27 (1966); J.T. MAIN, supra note 19, at 9, 127-28.
25. See Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, 1 PEmPzCIvEs IN AmEc.i His-
TORY 9, 32 (1967); Riemer, James Madison's Theory of the Self-Destructive Features of
Republican Government, 65 ETmcs 34, 35 (1954).
26. V. LrVNGsToN, THE INDEPENDENT REFLEcroR 181 (I. Klein ed. 1963).
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element of monarchy; the House of Lords, aristocracy; and the House
of Commons, democracy.27 And, although the analogy was not perfect,
colonial Americans conceived of their governments as embodying the
same mixture.
Some who participated in the framing and ratification of the Con-
stitution were thinking, perhaps, in these traditional terms of achiev-
ing a socio-constitutional balance among monarchy, aristocracy and
democracy. But the best minds were thinking new thoughts, and
Constitutional theory was undergoing a subtle evolution-an evolution
which Eidelberg ignores. The impetus for modification derived from
the failure of the doctrine of mixed government to square with the
reality of political conditions in America. Two of the three elements
necessary to proper balance were missing: "kings we never had among
us . . . [;] nobles we never had . . . " wrote John Adams.28 Nor did
Americans of the Revolutionary generation mean to create kings and
nobles. Virtually all Americans were determined that their govern-
ment should be of republican form, 29 and, as James Madison wrote, a
republican government must derive "all its powers directly or in-
directly from the great body of the people"-that is, from the
"democracy."30 Of course, even with all governmental power derived
from the people, men still feared threats to liberty from factional
seizures of power, for factions, they now realized, need not arise from
institutionalized socio-economic divisions; they could spring as well
from "an attachment to different leaders" or from "different opinions
concerning religion[,] . . . Government, and many other points."3' In
27. See I B. BAILYN, supra note 22, at 46-47; M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND TIE
SEPARATION OF Powams 68-72 (1967); Pargellis, The Theory of Balanced Government, it
THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 87, 39-46 (C. Read ed. 1938).
28. 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 20 (C.F. Adams ed. 1851).
29. C. KENYON, supra note 21, at xxvi-xxvii; cf. Riemer, The Republicanism of James
Madison, 69 POL. ScI. Q. 45 (1954).
30. Cf. TIHE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 281 (B.F. Wright ed. 1961). Even the executive, It
was thought, must derive its powers from the people, see W. GWYN, TrIE MEANING OF
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 123-24 (1965), although popular election of the President was
precluded, and election through the medium of the Electoral College and the House of
Representatives was required by the founding fathers' anticipation that it would be In-
possible for people from one part of the country to be aware of the qualifications of
presidential candidates from other parts and by the founders' fear that people would
always vote for candidates from their own state, thus giving the large states the best
chance of securing the Presidency. See 2 THE RECORDS OF TIlE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1966) jcited hereinafter as REcoRDs], at 29 (remarks of Mr. Sher-
man), 30 (remarks of Mr. Pinckney), 31 (remarks of Col. Mason), 32 (remarks of Mr.
Williamson). The Electoral College may initially have obscured the relationship of tile
executive to the people, but by the 1830's it was becoming clear that the President, as
much as the Congress, did represent the people. See W. GwYN, supra, at 124.
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 129-30 (B.F. Wright ed. 1961) (Madison). See generally
Riemer, supra note 25.
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addition, the possibility remained that, apart from a factional seizure
of power, individual representatives would betray their trust; these
individual governors also had to be deterred from tyranny.Y'
Since the old socio-constitutional balance of mixed government was
not relevant to American political conditions, men sought to create
new balances.33 Most early state constitutions failed to create them,
giving virtually all power to legislatures elected by the "democracy."
The result was that, at least in contemporary eyes, majority factions
gained power and enacted legislation which oppressed minorities.3 4
Several states dimly perceived the possibility of attaining balance
through application of the doctrine of separation of powers, originated
by seventeenth-century English republicans and resurrected by Montes-
quieu; but none of them paid more than lip service to the doctrine
before establishing a government which violated it.3' Only gradually,
during the course of the debates on the framing and ratification of
the Constitution, did a third doctrine emerge-that of checks and
balances. The principal author was James Madison, although others
participated in formulating the new concepts.30
Madison's doctrine of checks and balances was a variant of the
separation of powers theory, which he perceived to mean not that the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers must be kept completely
separate in three governmental departments, but only that "where
the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of another department, the funda-
82. See C. KENYON, supra note 21, at Lxiii-lxiv.
33. See Bailyn, supra note 18, at 351.
34. See, e.g., THE FE urrAT No. 10, at 129-30 (B.F. Wright ed. 1961) (Madison).
35. See A. NEviNs, THE A.FRicAN STATES DURsNG AND AFrr THE REVOLuroNx. 1775-
1789, at 165-66 (1924); M. VL, supra note 27, at 132-34, 141; Corwvin, The Progress of
Constitutional Theory between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the
Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIsr. REv. 511, 514 (1925). The doctrine of separation
of powers-that different institutions should make, enforce and interpret the law-was
also inadequate because it was easily confused with the doctrine of mixed government-
that different social groups should participate in all three institutional functions. An ex-
cellent example of a person succumbing to such confusion is John Adams, who argued
that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers should be not merely separated from.
but also balanced against, each other. To prevent the legislature from ovenhelning the
executive and the judiciary, he advocated
the adoption of a mixed constitution with an aristocratic chamber in the legislature
to hold the balance between the monarchic executive and the democratic legislative
chamber. Adams thus proposed two overlapping sets of checks and balances; the
three branches of the government and the monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic
parts of the legislative branch.
W. G ,vy, supra note 30, at 117. See also M. Vn.E, supra note 27, at 149; Sharp. The
Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. Cm. L Ray. 385, 399-
400 (1935).
86. Cf. IV. GwYN, supra note 30, at 122-23; M. VIL, supra note 7, at 152-54, 158-60.
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mental principles of a free constitution are subverted."37 Madison be-
lieved that true separation could not be insured by a mere "Con-
stitutional discrimination of the departments on paper.""8 For
experience had taught us a distrust of that security; and that it is
necessary to introduce such a balance of powers and interests, as
will guarantee the provisions on paper. Instead therefore of con-
tenting ourselves with laying down the Theory in the Constitu-
tion that each department ought to be separate & distinct, it was
proposed to add a defensive power to each which should maintain
the Theory in practice.39
Madison accordingly suggested that the executive should be given a
legislative power-namely, the veto. 40 And on the basis of his political
theory, the Senate was given the power to advise and consent upon
treaties and presidential appointments-a power of an executive
nature.
Madison's doctrine of blending powers, all of which were ultimately
derived from the people, so that they could check and balance each
other, quickly became the staple of American political thought.41
While the exact date at which the new replaced the old cannot be
determined, it is probably meaningless, no matter what that date, to
analyze the Constitution, as Eidelberg does, as essentially a product
of the traditional mixed government doctrine; for this doctrine was
soon forgotten. Madison's new theory, premised upon the nonexistence
of classes, was concerned with establishing institutional safeguards for
the separation of powers, not with achieving class balance; it was con-
cerned with establishing a complex system of institutional controls in
order to protect the people from their own and their representatives'
evil tendencies, 42 not with structuring the executive and legislative
37. Tm FEDERALIST No. 47, at 338 (BF. Wright ed. 1961) (Madison).
38. 2 id. 77.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. See M. VILE, supra note 27, at 160. Although in the early nineteenth century
some extreme Jeffersonian thinkers did not accept the doctrine of checks and balances,
including Jefferson himself during the last years of his life, see id. at 161-72, they were
a negligible minority which did not significantly alter the mainstream of American con-
stitutional thought. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 18-26 (1950).
Related to Madison's concept of checks and balances was his view of federalism as a
restraint upon factionalism. His contention here was that, while in a small democracy
one faction might be able to gain complete power, in a large, federal government there
would always be so many factions that no one would ever form a majority. Thus, feder-
alism combined with checks and balances to insure a perpetual diffusion of power. See
A. KocH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON 37-39 (1950); Corwin, supra note 35, at 534-35; Riemer,
supra note 25, at 37.
42. See Riemer, supra note 25, at 38-39.
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branches in order to create permanent preserves of aristocratic privi-
lege. The founding fathers did not seek to impede democratic majori-
ties from enacting legal or constitutional change through proper
constitutional procedures.43 Having participated in a revolution, they
knew that change was inevitable whenever a majority was determined
upon it. Many shared Jefferson's conviction, without carrying it to the
extreme he did, that "no society can make a perpetual constitution";
44
"amendments," the framers were certain, would be "necessary. " 45 Sev-
eral members of the 1787 convention, including Washington and
Hamilton, labelled the Constitution an "experiment";4 0 and even
Madison, who had greater hopes for the Constitution's endurance,
observed that "in framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we
should not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce."
47
II.
Especially because the founding fathers recognized the inevita-
bility of constitutional change,4 8 Eidelberg's argument that their
political philosophy, as incorporated in the Constitution, was anti-
thetic to change seems unpersuasive. Eidelberg, however, has a further
argument. He contends that the framers' creation of a Supreme Court
with the power of judicial review" gives rise, as a matter both of logic
and of history, to the notion of a permanent Constitution. He explains:
[T]o preserve the Constitution as a permanent law is the only
theoretical justification for investing judges with a permanent
tenure and with the power of judicial review. Otherwise the
judiciary, far from being the least, would be the most dangerous
branch of American government. A President may err; a Congress
may be partial; but the error and partiality may be corrected by
43. See 2 REcoR s 558 (remarks of Mr. Hamilton); Riemer, supra note 29, at 46-47.
44. 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOmAS JEFFERsON 121 (P. Ford ed. 1895). Jefferson's extreme
position was that, since "the earth belongs always to the living generation . .. [.] every
constitution, then, and every law, naturally e.xpires at the end of 19 years." Id.
45. 1 REcoRws 202-03 (remarks of Col. Mason).
46. 3 id. 302-03 (letter of Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler, May 5. 1788); Cornn,
The Constitution as Instrument and Symbol, 30 Am. PoL. Scr. REv. 1071, 1073, 1075
(1936); cf. 2 REcoRDs 221 (remarks of Mr. Ghorum); I S.E. Morusos, TuE Lirn %D Lrr-
TERS OF HAaRISON GRAY OTis 267 n.9 (1913). See generally P. NAGE., ONE NATION ItNt-
vismiLE 13-31 (1964), an excellent study of the concept of Union in American thought be-
tween the Revolution and the Civil War.
47. 1 REcoRDs 422. See also 2 id. 221; A. KocH, supra note 41, at 70-74; P. NAGEL,
supra note 46, at 27.
48. See pp. 514-15 infra.
49. Eidelberg merely assumes "the legitimacy of judicial review," not wanting "to be-
labor this much belabored controversy." EmEunRG 203; see H. HART & H. WmLEX
TnE FEDER CoURTs AND = FEERAL SYsmi 14-16 (1953).
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the turn of the electorate. Not so with the judges of the Court.
Their errors and partialities are permanently engrafted upon the
Constitution, become part of the body of constitutional law.
Should they read what is merely their own personal preferences
into the Constitution, or should they simply ratify, by their inter-
pretation of the Constitution, the dominant opinions of the day,
that Constitution will have been permanently damaged. . . . [I]f
judges were to regard the Constitution simply as a "developing
law"-and advocates of this notion have in mind a law without
fixed or permanent standards-or if the judicial interpretation of
the Constitution were simply to reflect the changing opinions of
popular majorities, the Supreme Court might as well be a tem-
porary body chosen by the people or by the people's representa-
tives. But then there would be no theoretical justification for the
Court to review, with the power to annul, the acts of a popularly
elected legislature. Basically, such a court would be nothing more
than an instrument of democratic justice....
[S]uch a court would be the degradation of the Court estab-
lished by the Founders.r0
Eidelberg is probably correct in saying that the Founders did not
foresee that the Supreme Court would be an institution which would
change the Constitution. The Court was to be an agency of perma-
nence and stability. When opponents of the Constitution argued that
"the power of construing the laws according to the spirit of the con-
stitution [would] enable that court to mould them into whatever
shape it may think proper," Hamilton answered in the Federalist that
such an argument was "made up altogether of false reasoning upon
misconceived fact" 01,-a conclusion which could "be inferred with
certainty, from the general nature of the judicial power .... "5 Con-
temporary commentators were almost unanimous in assuming,3 that
it was "the duty of judges to conserve the law, not to change it ....
Judges were "no more than the mouth that pronounces the words
50. EIDELBERG 241-42.
51. THE FEDERALisr No. 81, at 506 (BXF. Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
52. Id. 508.
53. One exception is Bishop Hoadley, who in 1717 observed that "whoever hath an
absolute authority to interpret . . . laws .. . is truly the law-giver . . . . and not the
person who first wrote or spoke them." Quoted in Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of
Constitutional Law, 15 J. PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY & SCINTIFIC MLrHoos 645, 652 (1918.
See also James Otis's argument in the Writs of Assistance Case, Quincy 395 (Mass. 1761),
where Otis makes the distinction familiar to modern lawyers that it is "better to observe
the known Principles of Law Yn [than] any one Precedent . I..." d. at 473. However,
the present reviewer's research through the records of several thousand unpublished
Massachusetts cases in the 1760's, 1770's, and 1780's tentatively indicates that few eigh.
teenth-century American lawyers understood the full import of Otis's distinction and
Hoadley's statement.
54. Corwin, supra note 35, at 526.
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of the law, mere passive beings" sworn to decide cases "according
to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce
a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one." 0 They had
no "power to repeal, to amend, to alter ... or to make new laws...
[for] in that case they would become legislators ... "" and "a knowl-
edge of mankind, and of Legislative affairs . . . [could not] be pre-
sumed to belong in a higher... degree to the Judges than to [legisla-
tors]." 58s The special skill of judges lay in their knowledge of the
"strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their
duty in every particular case that comes before them ... ."" Trained
in an era when rapid social change was only beginning to occur,
lawyers belonging to the Revolutionary generation could find plausible
what is for us a naive theory of the judicial function and could imagine
that the role of the Supreme Court under the Constitution would be
"to ascertain its meaning,"'00 not to fit it to new conditions as they
arose. It was only later, as the Constitution's meaning had to be
ascertained in application to particular cases, that lawyers became aware
that "strict rules and precedents" rarely provided dear, incontestable
answers.
Thus, Eidelberg's argument about the "intentions" of the framers
concerning the role of the Court is quite likely correct. But even
though the framers probably "intended" the Supreme Court to be an
agency of stability, they also "intended" the Constitution to be capable
of change-an "intention" which Eidelberg ignores, perhaps because,
from his twentieth-century perspective, it is more easily ignored than
reconciled with the "intention" which he does consider. For recon-
ciliation can be accomplished only by accepting the framers' assump-
don that the people retained a realistic power under article V to
amend "or abolish the established Constitution, whenever they find it
inconsistent with their happiness . . . ."I "The people were in fact,
the fountain of all power, and . . . they could alter constitutions as
they pleased." 2 Difficulty in securing future constitutional amend-
ments was neither desired nor anticipated; Jefferson, for one, assumed
55. 1 C. MoNrEsqumu, Tm SPn=T oF LAws 170 (J. Prichard ed. 1878).
56. 1 W. BI.ACSTONE, CoMm-rAMrss *69.
57. J. VA.NzmIr, TnE CASE, TREVrr AAsr WEEEN 27 (1787).
58. 2 RzcoRDs 76 (remarks of Mr. L. Martin); accord, I id. 97-98 (remarks of Mr.
Gerry); 2 id. 73 (remarks of Mr. Ghorum).
59. THE FEDEPAuST No. 78, at 496 (B.F. Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
60. Id. 492.
61. Id. 494.
62. 2 REcoRDs 476 (remarks of Mr. Madison).
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it would be easier to secure future amendments than to obtain ratifica-
tion of the original Constitution.63 The Convention agreed that "it
. . . [was] desirable . . . that an easy mode should be established for
supplying defects which will probably appear in the new system,"04
and accordingly "provision ... [was] made for the amendment of the
articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary."0
Because Eidelberg failed to consider the framers' assumptions that
the Constitution could be easily changed by amendment and to study
why those assumptions proved false during the nineteenth century, he
did not formulate a sophisticated historical analysis of the Supreme
Court's role in the constitutional system. One simply cannot write
about the Court's role and not consider why, at least since the end of
Reconstruction, the Court has produced constitutional change of the
same magnitude and significance as that originating in the Congress.0
The views of some modern commentators suggest one hypothesis:
since "[c]onstitutional law must grow and change in response to the
needs of the community but ... we rarely reform it by amendment,"
the Court should act as "the voice of the national conscience"07 and
"should be free to step in when the political process provides no inner
check . . ."I" It does appear that in the mid-nineteenth century, when
Congress and the nation's other political institutions were unable to
adjust the Constitution to new social conditions, such a need for
judicial intervention was felt.69 But why did political adjustment of
constitutional issues become impossible; why did Madison's carefully
conceived political machine fail to operate smoothly?
The forces which made adjustment impossible are as yet not fully
explored, but the concern of eighteenth-century political theorists
with restraining power suggests an answer. Although the chief argu-
ment made against the Constitution during the ratification struggle
had been that its adoption would unleash forces of arbitrary power,70
once the Constitution had been ratified, men not only accepted it,71
63. See R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 149 (1955).
64. 2 REcoRDs 558 (remarks of Mr. Hamilton).
65. Id. 84 (resolution of July 23, 1787, adopted unanimously by the Convention).
66. But see discussion at pp. 514-15 infra.
67. Cox, supra note 2, at 97.
68. Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HAsv. L. RaV. 1057,
1096-97 (1958).
69. See R. NICHOLS, Tim DISRUrION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 65-66, 70 (1948).
70. See generally C. KENYON, supra note 21, at bxii-lxxiv.
71. See P. NAGEL, supra note 46, at 54; R. RUTLAND, THE ORDEAL OF TIE CoNsntU.
TION 310-13 (1965); Schechter, The Early History of the Tradition of the Constitution, 9
Am. POL. Sci. RFV. 707, 710 (1915).
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but they soon began to "learn... from... infancy, to venerate the
instrument,"72 to "wish... [for its] inviolable preservation,"73 and to
look upon it as "intended to endure for ages to come."7
4 Of course,
men still feared for liberty, but they came to see the Constitution as
a guarantor of, not a threat to, that liberty-as "the only shield of the
people," whose dissolution would "soon be followed by the loss of all
that is valuable in liberty."75 The energies which men had previously
devoted to restraining power directly and thereby preserving liberty
were, it appears, now devoted to arguing for constructions of the Con-
stitution consistent with their visions of a ree society. The fears of
political theorists of the Revolutionary generation that minor legisla-
tion would provide "a precedent.., for making still greater inroads
on liberty" 76 were transformed into a fear that erroneous construction
of the Constitution would lead to the subversion of all its checks and
balances. Thus, those who sought to preserve liberty changed their
tactics from the colonial practice of opposing "measures subversive of
. . .Liberties" 77 into a new practice of challenging laws as uncon-
stitutional.78 In Congressional debates upon such measures as the na-
tional bank, the Alien and Sedition Acts, and the Louisiana Pur-
chase,79 politicians "reciprocally charge[d] each other with designs to
warp, subvert and destroy the Constitution itself."80
In the mid-nineteenth century, politicians continued to use such
rhetoric. They accused each other, for example, of hatching "conspir-
ac[ies] .. .against the Constitution" and introducing "construction[s]
. ..by which it may be... insidiously attacked, and inevitably de-
stroyed."81 Perhaps such constitutional rhetoric had become somewhat
72. Message of Gov. John Taylor to South Carolina Legislature, Nov. 1827, in 33
NILe' W EKLY R EGIsTER 230, 232 (1827).
73. 7 THE WRITINGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 327 (P. Ford ed. 1895).
74. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). As Corwin observed.
the Constitution was no longer seen as an experiment, as an instrument subject to easy
modification. Corwin, supra note 46, at 1075. See generally P. NAaL, supra note 46, at
104-44.
75. AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF Amos KENDALL 430 (V. Stickney ed. 1872).
76. 1 B. BAiLYN, supra note 22, at 64.
77. IV. LIvINGSTON, supra note 26, at 148.
78. See H. VON HOLsr, THE CONSTrrTToNAL AND PoLmcAL HlsToRY oF THE UNITED
STATES 70-79 (1876).
79. On the bank, see J. Ma.mLa, THE FEDERALIST El A, 1789-1801, at 56.59 (1960); on
the Alien and Sedition Acts, cf. id. 232, 238-40; on the Louisiana Purchase. see 2 H. AD
AMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMIMSTRATIONS OF JEFFERSON AND MAD-
isoN 78-93 (1889).
80. C. Pettit, An Impartial Review of the Rise and Progress of the Controversy be-
tween the Parties Known by the Names of the Federalists & Republcans (1800), 6 NLc-
AZINE OF HisT. 323, 339 (1913).
81. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 80, App. (1861) (remarks of Congressman Bing-
ham); id., 27th Cong., Ist Sess. 47, App. (1841) (remarks of Congressman Rayner); ac-
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unreal, yet it continued to have the effect of inflating issues-of trans-
forming mere differences over policies into power struggles in which
participants feared that defeat would bring perpetual tyranny at the
hands of whoever should emerge victorious. As a consequence of such
fears, men grew hesitant about making the concessions which are the
essence of all compromise. The South, for example, despite assurances
from Lincoln,82 viewed the 1860 election as portending not merely the
exclusion of slavery from territories in which slavery would never have
prospered, but the loss of "the power of self-government" as well. 0
Unwilling to yield anything to their opponents, politicians at the
same time demanded that their opponents yield all to them. In this
they merely reflected their constituents, among whom, by the 1850's,
constructive thought aimed at the solution of social problems had
been overwhelmed by dogmatic moral fervor and contempt for au-
thority.8 4 Willing to accept nothing less than total enactment of their
own panaceas, Americans of the mid-nineteenth century and the po-
litical institutions responsive to them rejected the compromises
reached in the past and could not agree to new ones. During the
nearly six decades between the adoption of the twelfth amendment
and the beginning of the Civil War, Congress, the institution which
was expected to bring about constitutional and sectional readjust-
ment, did not propose a single constitutional amendment, and the
lasting compromise of disputes through legislative interpretation of
the Constitution grew increasingly difficult. But upon the burning is-
sue of sectionalism, some sort of constitutional compromise and read-
justment was essential; neither North nor South was satisfied with the
constitutional system as it was functioning. It was at this point that
the Supreme Court in Dred Scott consciously resolved to preserve "the
peace and harmony of the country... [through] the settlement . . . by
judicial decision" of the sectional crisis.8 5
cord, id., 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 258 App. (1861) (remarks of Congressman Burnett); id.,
27th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1841) (resolution of Massachusetts legislature quoted by Con-
gressman Wise). See generally Smiley, Revolutionary Origins of the South's Constitutional
Defenses, 44 N.C. HIST. REV. 256 (1967).
82. See D. POTTER, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY IN THE SECESSION CIusIs 319-22 (2d ed.
1962); J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 150 (2d ed. 1961).
83. Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of
South Carolina from the Federal Union, in JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF TilE rEOI'LE
OF SOUTH CAROLINA HELD IN 1860, 1861 AND 1862, at 461, 466 (1862). See generally J. RAN-
DALL & D. DONALD, supra note 82, at 135-36; 3 J. RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STArES
FROM THE COMPROMIisE OF 1850, at 121-22 (1896).
84. See D. DONALD, LINCOLN RECONSIDERED 225-29 (2d ed. 1956); R. NIcnOLS, THE Dis-
RUPTION OF AMEICAN DEMOCRACY 22-24 (1948). See generally D. DONALD, supra, at 209-
35; S. ELKINS, SLAVERY 140-222 (1959); R. NICHOLS, supra, at 19-40.
85. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 455 (1857) (Wayne, J., concurring).
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Of course, the same factors which prevented congressional settle-
ment of the sectional crisis also thwarted the Court's effort. Much of
the nation in the late 1850's refused to accept the Dred Scott deci-
sion,86 and Congress in 1860-61 never gave serious consideration to the
possibility that the Court might have been an appropriate institution
for resolving the crisis growing out of the presidential election."- But in
less than two decades, in a similar election crisis, men did turn to the
Court. Every serious proposal considered by Congress for the settle-
ment of the 1876 election looked either to the Court's assumption of
full jurisdiction over the dispute or to individual justices to provide
the element of impartiality on a mediatory panel.88 Although histori-
ans have not studied the matter and we have only the word of con-
temporaries to rely upon, it appears that during the three decades fol-
lowing the 1876 election the Court "command[ed] the ... respect and
confidence of the people for whom it administer[ed] justice" to a
greater extent than ever before. 9 Why was the public willing to ac-
quiesce in the Court's decisions after 1876 but not in 1857? One rea-
son, again, might be that suggested by modern commentators: the
Supreme Court cannot hope to obtain public and professional support
unless its decisions are a product of "neutral principles" and of "rea-
son rather than fiat."' 0 It would be interesting to inquire whether the
Court's methods of doing its work changed between the 1850's and
the 1870's and whether its opinions were more persuasively or neu-
trally reasoned at the later date; some who were adversely affected by
the Court's later opinions conceded that they were at least more neu-
trally reasoned.91 On the other hand, changes may not have occurred
On the consciousness of the Court's desire to resolve the sectional crisis, see R. Nicuots.
supra note 83, at 63-66; Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision in the Light of Contemporary
Legal Doctrines, 17 Am. HIsT. REv. 52, 53-54 (1911).
86. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see J. RANDALL & D. DONALD, supra note 81; at 114;
Corwin, supra note 84, at 68-69; Hodder, Some Phases of the Dred Scott Case, 16 ,Ms.
VALLEY HMsT. REv. 3, 21 (1929).
87. For discussion of the various proposals considered in Congress, see D. Pormn.
supra note 82, at 7, 61-72, 93-111; 3 J. Rhodes, supra note 83, at 159, 149-55, 160.61. 175-
79; 254-59, 266-70.
88. See P. HAWORTH, THE HAYEs-TILDEN DisPutrED PRESIDENEIIL ELECTION OF 1876, at
190, 197-207 (1906).
89. Cf. J. CHOATE, THE SuPREmE COURT OF THE UNITEn STATES 1 (1903). See also C.
BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITnION OF TE UNITED STATES, at vi
(2d ed. 1935); s. BURKE, CENTENNIAL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 9
(1890); C. HAINES, THE AmERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 285 (1911); E. PIIEu's,
THE UNITED STATES SUPREmE COURT AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE 19-21 (1890).
90. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Jus-
tices to the Supreme Court, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 113 (1959); Wechsler, supra note 2.
91. See "W. PATrON, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE CIVIL RIGHrs Act 5-6
(1884).
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in judicial reasoning, or, if changes did occur, perhaps they were un-
related to the change in public attitude toward the Court. The change
in attitude may have resulted simply from differences in the nature of
the issues at stake, although the crisis of 1876-1877 was of nearly as
great magnitude as the crisis of 1857-1861.92 Another possibility is that
the change in attitude toward the Court may have been part of a
broader change in attitude occurring after the Civil War toward all
of the bonds of society-a change which manifested itself in a grow-
ing search for order and stability and, arguably, in a growing recog-
nition that authoritative, elitist institutions were needed to attain
that order and stability. Historians have yet to determine whether such
a change occurred.93 But if it did, it might lead us to formulate a
more complex and subtle analysis than we now have of the restraints
which the need for public support imposes upon the Court.9
In addition to investigating the failure of political institutions in
the 1850's and the shift in public attitude in the 1870's, historians
seeking to understand the complex process by which the Supreme
Court became a successful facilitator of constitutional change must
take into account the creativity inherent in the very nature of con-
stitutional adjudication. It seems probable that even before the fail-
ure of the political process to produce constitutional change had been
perceived or had in fact occurred, the Court under Marshall was act-
ing as an agency of such change. Justice Frankfurter has spoken of
the "creative role" of the Marshall Court "in conveying to ordinary
men the meaning of the Delphic language of the Constitution."0 5
Since it would be difficult to maintain that the Marshall Court was
92. See C.V. WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913, at 25 (1951), where It
is noted:
To Abram S. Hewitt, national Democratic chairman, a peaceful solution seemed cx-
tremely doubtful in 1876. He knew of fifteen states in which Democratic war vet-
erans were organizing for military resistance to the election 'fraud,' and to him 'It
seemed as if the terrors of civil war were again to be renewed.' One historian con-
cluded that more people expected a bloody outbreak in the crisis of 1876.1877 than
had anticipated such an outcome in the crisis of 1860-1861.
See generally P. HAWORTH, supra note 88, at 168-96; C.V. WOODVARD, REUNION AND RE-
ACTION 3-21 (1951).
93. That such a change occurred after the Civil War is suggested by the pre-War at-
titudes toward authority discussed at note 84 supra. At some point, the nation must
have swung away from those pre-War attitudes toward attitudes more favorable to or-der, stability and authority. See G. FREDRICKSON, THE INNER CIVIL WAR 186-89, 201-02,
205-11, 221-22 (1965); E. KIRKLAND, DREAM AND THOUGHT IN THE BusiNEss CoMrMUNITY,1860-1900, at 10, 13, 26-27 (1956); G.E. WHITE, THE EASTERN ESTABLISHMENT AND THlE
WESTERN EXPERIENCE 175, 185 (1968).
94. See Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169,
250-57 (1968).
95. F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 25
(1937).
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producing change in response to the failure of other institutions to
produce it, any change must have been in response to something else.
Eidelberg avoided all this complexity simply by ignoring it. But it
cannot be ignored; no historically grounded analysis of the Supreme
Court's institutional role can be formulated without coming to terms
with the Court's nineteenth-century history. The first step, it would
appear, is to ask what exactly do we mean when we speak of the
Court as bringing about constitutional change? Does such change oc-
cur only when the Court either explicitly or implicitly overrules or
otherwise departs from a prior decision? Does change occur when the
Court applies a constitutional principle to a novel situation? What if
the authors of the principle had considered how it should be applied
to the facts; would one define as change an application consistent with
the thought of a majority of the authors? Should the definition of
change be broad enough to encompass cases in which the Court ad-
heres to precedent but in so doing, because of intervening changes in
political, economic or social facts not considered by the Court, pro-
duces consequences for society different from those which the prece-
dent had produced?96
It is regrettable that Eidelberg did not ask such questions, for if he
had, he would have seen the impossibility of analyzing the Supreme
Court's function as the founding fathers had analyzed it. The Court's
subsequent history has made plain the inadequacy of "strict rules and
precedents" derived from the past. The proper question is not
whether but when the Court should deviate from such rules and prece-
dents. Perhaps by defining precisely the nature of past deviations and
analyzing their causes we can begin to arrive at some answers.
96. Browrn v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). would have been an example of
such a case if the Court had reached the opposite result and had not taken into account
the sociological findings that segregation generates a feeling of inferiority among blacks.
Id. at 494. For, although public-school segregation was not beneficial to blacks at the
time of BTown, it has been suggested that such segregation may have been beneficial at
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See A. BICKU, supra note 2. at 71;
Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50
CoLum. L. Rav. 131, 161-62 (1950).
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